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ABSTRACT 
Due to China’s growing energy needs that stem from its unrelenting economic development, 
Beijing stresses the importance of maintaining a continuous supply of energy - particularly oil - 
to maintain its impressive economic growth. However, seeing as China’s domestic resources 
are unable to satisfy its projected future oil demands, the Chinese realise that, barring 
significant domestic oil discoveries, their dependency on oil imports - particularly from the 
Middle East - will continue to increase. Of particular importance to the Chinese is the Persian 
Gulf as it contains a large share of the world’s proven oil reserves. China has thus sought to 
improve relations with Persian Gulf nations such as Iran. However, Iran’s pursuit to obtain 
nuclear capabilities has implicated China in Iranian-American tensions. Although China has 
sought to steer clear of becoming embroiled in the Iranian nuclear situation due to its 
improved standing in the Gulf, Beijing has unavoidably become a significant actor in the 
diplomatic brinkmanship regarding Iran’s nuclear situation. By means of a literature review, 
this paper posits that China’s response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions essentially mirrors its 
overall diplomatic strategy towards the Middle East; a strategy of pragmatically balancing its 
own relationship with the US whilst simultaneously advancing profitable geo-economic 
relations with oil rich Gulf nations. 
The author: 
Mandira Bagwandeen is a Junior Analyst for the Asia Pacific Region at Salamanca Group in 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CCS discussion papers aim to contribute to the academic debate on China’s global rise and the 
consequences thereof for African development. The CCS therefore explicitly invites scholars 
from Africa, China, or elsewhere, to use this format for advanced papers that are ready for an 
initial publication, not least to obtain input from other colleagues in the field. Discussion 
papers should thus be seen as work in progress, exposed to (and ideally stimulating) policy-
relevant discussion based on academic standards.  
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately three decades of relentless, fast-paced economic growth has produced an oil deficit that is 
forcing China to become increasingly dependent on oil imports. Current domestic consumption is 
estimated to be at 9.2 million barrels per day (b/d) and domestic production at 4.5 million b/d,1 thus, as a 
result of this supply and demand gap, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) imports more than half of its 
oil to meet the country’s energy needs. Since most of China’s oil fields have reached production plateaus 
or are in decline, its dependency on foreign oil is not expected to lessen. Rather, foreign oil is projected to 
make up 60 to 80 per cent of the Asian Giant’s oil consumption by 2020.2  
In its oil diversification efforts, China has spread its economic and diplomatic interests to wherever there 
are excess hydrocarbon resources.3 Beijing has inevitably sought to secure oil imports from the world’s 
richest oil regions, most notably the Persian Gulf.4 Noting the Persian Gulf’s rich endowment in “black 
gold”, Chinese foreign policy has prioritised improving relations with Gulf States as “officials regard the 
region to be of long-lasting geo-economic and geo-political significance.”5 Moreover, in the interest of 
ensuring energy security, Beijing is especially attracted to Gulf producers because of their “large proven 
oil reserves, idle surplus capacity and relatively low development and production costs.”6 By fostering 
closer economic relations with oil-producing Gulf States, China hopes to gain a secure supply of oil from 
a region that has a strong US presence. Via the fostering of economic interdependence, Beijing aims to 
lock into the Gulf’s fuel reserves as energy experts predict that the Persian Gulf will remain an important 
source of crude oil for China over the next 25 years.7  
Although the marked expansion of Chinese diplomatic, energy and economic interests in the Gulf 
represent one aspect of the most important geopolitical trends of the 21st century, China, aware of the 
United States of America’s dominant role in the Middle East,8 has treaded carefully in the region in order 
to avoid being perceived by Washington as a threat to its hegemonic position in the area. Yet, as a result 
of its notably improved presence in the Persian Gulf, Beijing has been thrust into the mix of diplomacy 
and tensions surrounding the dispute over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. As a result, the Sino-Iranian 
relationship has been placed under intense scrutiny in the wake of calls from a US-led international 
coalition imploring China to support their efforts in promoting the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear 
programme.  
This paper, foremost, aims to demonstrate that China’s Gulf diplomacy is driven by its energy interests in 
the Middle East. Secondly, in analysing China’s diplomatic brinkmanship in relation to the Iranian nuclear 
                                                     
1
 Amar Causevic, “A Thirsty Dragon: Rising Chinese Crude Oil Demand and Prospects for Multilateral Energy 
Security Cooperation,” Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Report No.116 (2012): pp. 2-3. Accessed: 04 July 
2012, URL: http://www.jhubc.it/ADMISSIONSBLOGDOCUMENTS/a per cent20thirsty per cent20dragon.pdf 
2
 Erica Downs, “China,” The Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series (2006), p. 10. Accessed: 
16 July 2012, URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/12/china/12china.pdf 
3
 Zha Daojiong, “China’s Energy Security and its International Relations,” The China and Eurasia Forum 
Quarterly, vol.3, no.3 (2005): p. 53. 
4
 Hongyi H. Lai, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: is it a global security threat?” Third World Quarterly, vol.28, no.3 
(2007): p. 522. 
5 John Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” Middle East Journal, vol.52, no.3 (1998): 
p. 353. 
6
 Ibid., p. 356. 
7
 Downs, “China,” p. 2. 
8
 The Middle East is traditionally comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Gaza Strip, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, UAE, West Bank and Yemen. 
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issue, this paper proposes that the PRC have, in efforts to avoid being perceived as a threat to the US’s 
dominance in the region, cautiously and tactfully approached Middle Eastern nations. 
2. CHINA’S PERSIAN GULF DIPLOMACY 
The Gulf is strategically related to Beijing’s various interests because of its geo-political location, 
economic opportunities, security issues and, most importantly, its abundant oil supplies. However, the 
PRC lacks the historically forged links and deep connections that Western powers have established with 
Middle Eastern nations. Thus, the challenge for China is to strengthen its economic standing in the 
Middle East, especially with Gulf countries. Aside from being a radical and revolutionary influence during 
the Cold War, Beijing has rarely assumed a central or influential role in the region. 
This does not mean that China has been inactive in this part of the world; on the contrary, it has utilised 
numerous strategic advantages to improve its political and economic position in the Gulf. In doing so, 
China has managed to consolidate its energy security whilst simultaneously establishing foundations 
needed to enhance its political position in the Middle East. This could, in the face of the US’s hegemonic 
control of the region, embolden Beijing to pursue a more active role in the area. However, such an 
endeavour would likely interfere with Washington’s Middle Eastern interests. 9  Aware of China’s 
increasing dependence on oil imports, and Beijing’s willingness to interact with pariah states to extract oil 
and gas resources, the West (and particularly the US) believes that Beijing will use all available means to 
satisfy its voracious appetite for oil. As a result, Washington is concerned with China’s growing presence 
in the Middle East as the Americans speculate that Beijing’s increasing involvement in the region could 
destabilise the regional order, and undermine the US’s access to oil and efforts to stabilise the region.10 
However, contrary to negative accusations and predictions, Lai outlines that Beijing has been mindful of 
the US and its interests in this region as China attempts to pursue its Middle-Eastern goals though a 
constructive and cooperative approach.11  
2.1 CHINA’S ENERGY QUEST AND THE PERSIAN GULF 
In an effort to fuel its expanding economy, Beijing has adopted a “look beyond China” strategy to 
procure reliable sources of energy. This has resulted in the Asian Giant intensifying its relations with 
Persian Gulf states that are heavily endowed with energy resources. Although Beijing has in the past 
viewed events in the Middle East through a revolutionary, Maoist ideology, China’s policy towards the 
region has evolved over the last three decades from an ideological focus to a more rational, pragmatic 
approach.12 China’s growing involvement in this part of the globe stems from its aspirations to assume a 
more proactive role in maintaining a stable Middle East, as the PRC perceives that the region  provides 
                                                     
9
 Philip Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China Oil and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 
135 & 139. 
10 Lai, “China’s Oil Diplomacy: is it a global security threat?” p. 520 
11
 Ibid., p. 530. 
12
 Bryce Wakefield, “Introduction,” in China and the Persian Gulf, eds. Bryce Wakefield and Susan L. 
Levenstein (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2010), p. 2. Accessed: 16 July 
2012, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA per cent20Program_China per cent20and per 
cent20the per cent20PG.pdf 
Wu Bingbing, “Strategy and Politics in the Gulf as seen from China,” in China and the Persian Gulf, eds. Bryce 
Wakefield and Susan L. Levenstein (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2010), p. 
10. Accessed: 16 July 2012, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA per 
cent20Program_China per cent20and per cent20the per cent20PG.pdf 
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Beijing with a potential platform to demonstrate that, as a rising power, it is a ‘responsible stakeholder’.13 
China’s objectives for Sino-Arab relations are best expressed by former president Hu Jintao, who (during 
his time in office) stressed four points that China and Arab states should focus on to strengthen relations. 
According to Hu, China and Arab states should strive: 
to promote political relations on the basis of mutual respect, to forge closer trade and economic links so as to 
achieve common development, to expand cultural exchanges through drawing upon each other's experience, and to 
strengthen co-operation in international affairs with the aim of safeguarding world peace and promoting common 
development.14 
Despite massive oil discoveries in other regions, Lee and Shalmon highlight that the Middle East will, for 
the foreseeable future, continue to have the largest oil reserves as well as the lowest production costs.15 
Thus, with an expected increase in oil import levels, Beijing is pushing to gain a larger share of Gulf oil 
markets, especially as 51 per cent of proven oil reserves are located in the Middle East, of which 33 per 
cent is situated in Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries.16 China is especially attracted to Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Iraq as 68 per cent of the region’s oil (and over 25 per cent of the global total) is located 
within these three states.17 According to Budike, China’s dependency on Gulf oil is predicted to increase 
from an estimated 42 per cent to 70 per cent between 2015 and 2030.18 This could mean that, ceteris 
paribus, at least 9.3 million barrels per day (mb/d) would have to be imported from this region.19 With 
energy being the primary driver of Sino-Gulf relations, it is imperative that China’s energy security 
strategy recognises the importance of Gulf oil in maintaining the continued advancement of the state’s 
economy.20 Thus, China’s oil security in the Gulf depends on efforts to establish economic, political, and 
security measures to protect and ensure a reliable and sufficient supply of oil at affordable prices.21 
Like China, whose energy interests motivate its pursuit of Gulf countries, oil is also a driving factor for 
the Gulf’s interactions with Asia, especially the PRC. The Asian Giant is viewed by Gulf States as a 
massive market for their oil exports. In light of oil demand having plummeted in the wake of the global 
                                                     
13
 Pan Zhenqiang, “China and the Middle East,” in China’s Growing Role in the Middle East: Implications for 
the Region and Beyond (Washington: The Nixon Centre, 2010), p. 87. Accessed 05 February 2013, URL: 
http://cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf 
14
 Cited by: Zhenqiang, “China and the Middle East,” p. 87. 
15
 Henry Lee and David Shalmon, “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Initiatives in the Middle East,” Belfer Centre 
for Science and International Affairs, (John F. Kennedy School of Government: Harvard University, 2007), p. 
14. Accessed: 16 July 2012, URL: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/china per cent20oil per cent20h per 
cent20lee per cent202007.pdf 
16
 CIA World Factbook, Estimated Proven Oil Reserves as of 2011. Accessed: 10 June 2013, URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2178rank.html. 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional political and economic intergovernmental organisation that 
is comprised of six Persian Gulf nations - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, 
and Oman. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Jurgen C.U. Budike, Securing China’s Oil Supply from the Persian Gulf: The Case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
MA thesis, International School for Humanities and Social Studies (ISHSS): University of Amsterdam, (2010), 
p. 92. Accessed: 17 July 2012, URL: http://epa.iias.asia/files/Jurgen per cent20Budike_Securing per 
cent20China's per cent20Oil per cent20Supply per cent20From per cent20the per cent20Persian per 
cent20Gulf.pdf 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 Emile Hokayem, “Looking East: A Gulf Vision or Reality?” in China and the Persian Gulf, eds. Bryce 
Wakefield and Susan L. Levenstein (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2010), p. 
39. Accessed: 16 July 2012, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA per 
cent20Program_China per cent20and per cent20the per cent20PG.pdf 
21
 Budike, Securing China’s Oil Supply from the Persian Gulf: The Case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, p. 92. 
8 
 
economic crisis, most GCC states are focusing on securing access to the Chinese domestic market which, 
according to Sager, is ranked as the fastest growing energy market in the world.22 Furthermore, Sager 
posits that, in light of the global trend amongst developed nations towards greener energy resources, Gulf 
oil producers seek new markets to lessen their dependency on traditional and established oil consuming 
nations.23 However, due to the Gulf’s comparatively steep oil prices and China’s limited capabilities to 
refine high sulphur crude oil from this region, Chinese foreign energy policy seeks to strengthen political 
relations with Gulf oil-producing states, whilst simultaneously courting additional suppliers whose oil can 
be purchased at cheaper prices.24 
Taking into consideration US interests in the Middle East and historical ties between Western energy 
companies and Gulf oil-producing states, China, in the 1990s, adopted a foreign policy towards the region 
of “being detached generally and involved appropriately.” 25  Essentially, this meant that with such a 
pragmatic orientation, the PRC had to compromise between its core national interests and the dominant 
role of the US in the Middle East. China’s pragmatism is essentially divided into two categories: firstly, by 
focusing on trade, economic and energy interests, Beijing downplays its ideological differences with pro-
US Gulf States (such as Saudi Arabia).26 On the other hand, China, under the precondition of not 
purposely or directly challenging US interests, aims to improve relations with anti-American governments 
(such as Iran) that provide little Western competition for Chinese national oil companies (NOCs).27 
However, the main evaluation of Beijing’s Gulf policy pertains to China’s ability to manoeuvre around 
pro- and anti-American regimes28 as there is “something inherently instable (sic) in a Middle Eastern (sic) 
order that relies on the West for its security and on the East for its prosperity.”29 Alterman contends that 
there is little doubt that the Middle East can create contention between China and the US as they seek to 
address their differing interests in the region. 
Chinese overseas energy acquisitions in the Middle East have been viewed with distrust by the US as 
Washington fears that China’s growing presence, combined with its thirst for energy, will make it a 
destabilising force in the region.30 Yet, both countries have vested interests in the stability of the region 
for the pursuit of energy goals – the need to ensure a stable and reliable oil supply at a fair price. Aside 
from this shared concern over the Gulf’s energy security, both nations have an aversion towards nuclear 
development and the consequential possibility of an arms race that could severely impede Gulf oil 
supplies. Since energy is the common denominator between these two nations, cooperative, instead of 
competitive and conflicting, relations between Washington and China over the Middle East is a 
                                                     
22
 Abdulaziz Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” in China’s Growing Role 
in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond (Washington: The Nixon Centre, 2010), p. 2. 
Accessed: 05 February 2013, URL: http://cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Charles Ziegler, “The Energy Factor in China’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of Chinese Political Sciences, 
vol.11, no.1 (2006): p. 9. Accessed: 16 July 2012, URL: http://jcps.sfsu.edu/past per cent20issues/JCPS2006a/2 
per cent20Energy per cent20Factor per cent20in per cent20China_Ziegler.pdf  
25
 Bingbing, “Strategy and Politics in the Gulf as seen from China,” p. 19. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Bingbing, “Strategy and Politics in the Gulf as seen from China,” p. 19. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 John Alterman, “The Vital Triangle,” in China and the Persian Gulf, eds. Bryce Wakefield and Susan L. 
Levenstein (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2010), p. 35. Accessed: 16 July 
2012, URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA per cent20Program_China per cent20and per 
cent20the per cent20PG.pdf 
30
 Cited by: Zhao Hongtu, “China’s Energy Interest and Security in the Middle East,” in China’s Growing Role 
in the Middle East: Implications for the Region and Beyond (Washington: The Nixon Centre, 2010), p. 54. 
Accessed: 05 February 2013, URL: http://cftni.org/full-monograph-chinas-growing-role-in-me.pdf  
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possibility. However, given their diverging approaches towards the region, such an assertion may be 
considered as too optimistic. Nevertheless, with common strategic, regional and energy interests shared 
by both sides, the possibility of improved bi-lateral Chinese-American co-operation in the Middle East 
should not be abandoned, but embraced as it offers a foundation for collaboration that could not only 
improve security in the Middle East, but also enhance Sino-American relations.31 
Bajpaee cautions that, although Washington and Beijing are not engaged in explicit competition in the 
Middle East, it is not difficult to envision that the region could emerge as a source of contention between 
these two states as, in conjunction with their energy competition in this part of the world, China and the 
US present opposing models of international conduct.32 Whilst Washington has carried out humanitarian 
intervention, pre-emptive action and regime change campaigns in the Middle East, Beijing has sought to 
refrain from such activities by adhering to its preference of non-intervention, state-sovereignty and 
territorial integrity – a traditional Westphalian method of engaging in international affairs that has become 
particularly appealing to Arab states in the face of US attempts to spread democratic principles across the 
region.33 By considering the relationships between China, the US and the Middle East to be triangular, 
Alterman contends that interactions between any two sides can affect the other party.34 However, since a 
triangle connotes relatively equal partners where actions taken by one party can affect the other two sides, 
Yuan denies that there is a US-China-Middle East triangle as the Americans outweigh the Chinese and 
Middle-Easterners in terms of power.35 In addition, since relations between the three parties have only 
recently formed, all sides have to overcome numerous barriers to reach a stage of interconnectedness 
(triangle relations).36 
Although Sinologists doubt Beijing’s strategic wisdom and operational effectiveness in the Middle East, 
China believes that it can strengthen its position in the region, especially with Gulf States that are 
interested in balancing their historical overreliance on the US. Furthermore, given the lack of substantial 
improvement in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the US invasion of Iraq, and the continued destabilisation of 
the region as an aftermath, Gulf States have realised that China “brings a paucity of political baggage to 
the negotiation table,” in addition to a massive potential market for Middle-Eastern goods and services.37 
Thus, China is considered to be an attractive alternative to the US as it is not tainted by the same ills 
burdening the US vis-à-vis the region. Furthermore, by adhering to the principles of sovereignty and non-
interference, China has become more appealing to Middle East states as politically, unlike the US, China 
does not press Gulf States about their domestic political environments – especially the need for 
democracy and respect for human rights. Consequently, this makes dealings with China less challenging 
for incumbent regimes.38 
Beijing is not the only beneficiary in the Gulf-China relationship as the strengthening of ties with China 
fits well into the GCC states’ strategy to diversify their international relationships in an attempt to lessen 
their dependence on the US. China’s shift from an exporter to a consumer market is viewed as an 
opportunity for GCC countries to improve their competitive standing and enlarge their share in the 
                                                     
31
 Alterman, “The Vital Triangle,” p. 29. 
32 Chietigj Bajpaee, China’s Growing Middle East Role and the Potential for China-US Conflict. Accessed: 16 
May 2013, URL: http://www.japanfocus.org/-Chietigj-Bajpaee/1677 
33 Bajpaee, China’s Growing Middle East Role and the Potential for China-US Conflict. 
34
 Alterman, “The Vital Triangle,” p. 28. 
35
 Yuan, “China’s Strategic Interests in the Gulf and Trilateral Relations among China, The US and Arab 
Countries,” p. 28. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” p. 356. 
38
 Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” p. 16. 
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world’s largest market.39 In this context, China’s open-door policy is complemented by non-politicised 
relationships, which have led Beijing and Middle-Eastern countries to make investments worth billions of 
dollars.40 
Although a picture of favourable circumstances for Chinese advancement in the Middle East has been 
painted, there are barriers to China’s mission of improving ties in the Persian Gulf. International 
sanctions and the US war in Iraq have hindered China from pushing its agenda forward in Baghdad, 
whilst complicated geology and a strenuous business climate have strained investment plans in Iran. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia, China’s largest oil exporter, is reluctant to privatise oil fields, although the 
Saudi government has offered to consider foreign investment in integrated domestic natural-gas projects. 
Chinese NOCs have not favoured this option as they consider it to be a costly investment which does not 
provide a shareholding in oil supplies to ship back to China.41 
Unlike the US, Japan and Europe – which have a lengthy history of importing oil from the Middle East - 
Beijing is at a disadvantage due to its late arrival in this oil rich region and because, in contrast to its 
counterparts, China is still attempting to foster secure relations with Middle-Eastern states that can assure 
the shipment of oil to the PRC.42 By deliberately avoiding a singular focus on oil supplies, Beijing has 
attempted to expand the scope of economic exchanges between GCC countries and itself. China’s 
strategy aims to build a level of economic interdependence between Beijing and Arab states that will 
result in increased trade (especially with regards to the purchasing of oil and gas). Through establishing 
economic interdependence, Beijing realises that it would be difficult and economically straining for Gulf 
countries to disrupt oil supplies to China.43 Economically, China is pursuing a ‘two imports and one 
export’ strategy to advance its energy relationship with Arab oil-producing states.44 The ‘two imports’ 
refers to oil imports and the necessary capital needed to develop China’s oil industry, whilst the ‘one 
export’ refers to Beijing’s investments in oil exploration and development projects in the Middle East.45 
With the aim of establishing a mutually beneficial trade relationship, GCC-China trade increased from 
US$ 12 billion in 2003 to US$ 68 billion in 2009.46 Moreover, Beijing has allowed Chinese oil firms to 
gain a strategic foothold in the region’s energy sector by allowing NOCs to negotiate long-term supply 
contracts and production sharing arrangements directly with Persian Gulf governments instead of 
international oil firms.47 On the political front, China is expanding its diplomacy in the region, albeit 
carefully under the watchful eye of the US, as Beijing is aware of Washington’s potential to thwart oil 
supplies to China. Although Downs highlights that the 1970s’ oil crisis demonstrated that bi-lateral 
relationships are “virtually useless during a crisis,” the PRC seems to, in weighing potential gains under 
non-crisis periods, sideline historical evidence as it persists with the establishment of strong bi-lateral ties 
to ensure the security of oil supply from the Gulf.48 Several Chinese state leaders have undertaken state 
visits to the Middle East in an effort to strengthen ties in the region, especially with countries that have an 
                                                     
39
 Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” p. 12. 
40
 For more information on the numerous investments China has made in the Middle East see:  
Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” pp. 12-14. 
41
 Amy M. Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” Survival, vol.44, no.1 (2002): p. 124. 
42
 Erica Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2000), p. 48. Accessed: 
16 July 2012, URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA384039 
43
 Lee and Shalmon, “Searching for Oil: China’s Oil Initiatives in the Middle East,” p. 15. 
Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security, p. 33. 
44
 Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security, p. 48. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 Sager, “GCC-China Relations: Looking Beyond Oil-Risks and Rewards,” p. 7. 
47
 Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” p. 356. 
48 Erica Downs, “The Chinese Energy Security Debate,” The China Quarterly, vol.177 (2004): p. 38. 
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aversion towards the US. In terms of utilising its military capabilities for its energy drive, Downs suggests 
that China could use its arms sales to develop closer ties with heavily oil endowed Middle-Eastern 
countries, as Beijing is considered to be an attractive option for states seeking ballistic-weapons 
technology that the US is reluctant to provide.49 
In spite of its strategic approach towards the Gulf, China has had to rethink its strong dependence on 
Persian Gulf oil. Taking into consideration the volatility of the Middle East, the dominance of the US in 
the region, and having to ship oil through the Strait of Malacca – one of the most dangerous shipping 
lanes in the world – China has sought to aggressively diversify its oil imports. In doing so, China has 
ventured beyond the Middle East into Africa, Central Asia and the Americas. However, having taken into 
consideration global oil distribution, production capacity and supply potential, many scholars such as 
Downs still emphasise that the Middle East, and especially the Persian Gulf, will continue to be 
imperative to China’s oil supply50as it is predicted that as much as 70-80  per cent of China’s future oil 
imports will have to be sourced from the Middle East.51 Beijing’s NOCs have thus aggressively bid against 
other major oil companies in an attempt to monopolise the region’s vast oil reserves.  
Moreover, China is seeking to fortify its oil security by updating its age-old refining facilities to process 
Middle-Eastern crudes, as Chinese refiners are unable to process most of the crude oil from the region 
due to the high sulphur content.52 Undertaking the construction of facilities that are capable of processing 
sour crude oil demonstrates China’s growing dependence on Arab oil. Furthermore, it also highlights 
Beijing’s view that crude imports are a better source of energy security since refined oil is more expensive 
– due to significant storage costs and the relatively high deterioration rate of refined oil.53 Yet, due to its 
increasingly projected dependence on Persian Gulf oil, Beijing could face new strategic vulnerabilities. 
Although the Chinese have greatly improved their military might, their naval build up (however 
impressive) is insufficient to protect the East-Asian sea lanes from threats of piracy or guarantee 
protected access to Persian Gulf oil.54 Thus, China acknowledges that it is unavoidably forced to depend 
on the US military to protect its access to the Gulf’s oil. As a result, Beijing has to restrain its geostrategic 
plans for sponsoring Middle East nations that are hostile towards the US and its regional allies. 
Although Middle-Eastern countries may attempt to lessen their dependency on the US, states in the 
Middle East are aware of China’s reluctance to bring the hammer down on Iran – a potential threat to 
regional security. GCC members believe that, in keeping its options open, China is only willing to play a 
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 Downs, China’s Quest for Energy Security, p. 49. 
Amy M. Jaffe and Steven W. Lewis, “Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy,” Survival, vol.44, no.1 (2002): p. 124. 
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secondary role in the region.55 As such, Middle-Eastern states acknowledge that, in spite of the variety of 
advantages that China provides, their security continues to lie in NATO’s palms and therefore, by 
implication, largely in American hands.56 Arab states acknowledge that, unlike the US who has invested 
millions of dollars in attempts to resolve regional conflicts in the Middle East, China will maintain its 
secondary role in the region as it waits to capitalise on situations where Washington may falter. Lee and 
Shalmon assert that China accepts that it is not about to replace US dominance in the region; instead 
Beijing is focusing on shifts at the margin by proactively seeking to enhance Sino-Arab ties. Since energy 
security is the backbone of China’s forays into the Middle East, through attempts to secure fuel supplies 
Beijing is striving to extend relationships beyond energy in an attempt to create an economic 
interdependence that can ultimately assure the shipment of Gulf oil to China. In seeking to improve 
relations with Arab nations, Lee and Shalmon posit that Beijing can draw on its Gulf energy dealing 
experiences to equip China to handle the diplomatic and strategic complexities of oil geo-politics in the 
region, especially in the Persian Gulf.57 However, it is essential that Beijing maintains its pragmatic stance 
in order to avoid disagreements with Gulf States and the possibility of souring its relations with its vital 
economic partner and largest export market – the US.58  
3. THE SINO-IRANAIN RELATIONSHIP 
Before proceeding to analyse China’s response to Iran’s nuclear situation, an understanding of the Sino-
Iranian relations would be beneficial. Due to the multi-dimensional and ever-changing nature of Sino-
Iranian relations it would be impossible to cover every facet of Beijing-Tehran ties in this paper. 
Therefore, the scope of this section will focus on what are considered to be the more prominent aspects 
of the relationship that ties Beijing and Tehran together despite the international pressure placed on 
China to implement measures to further isolate Iran for its defiant nuclear activities. This paper will 
analyse the Sino-Iranian relationship from three points of view, namely: trade, energy and geostrategic 
reasoning. These three factors have been chosen as, based on the literature reviewed, they appear to be 
the ‘glue’ that binds these two countries together. 
In spite of periods when relations were strained, Sino-Iranian ties have gradually evolved into a sturdy 
relationship. This relationship is strengthened by the historical commonalities between the two nations, 
namely that both consider themselves to be heirs of once great civilisations that were victimised by 
Western imperialists. However, aside from historical similarities binding China and Iran, “circumstances 
have conspired to make China and Iran well suited energy partners.”59 Chinese efforts to enhance their 
relations with Iran have mainly stemmed from China’s search for energy resources, an opportunity to 
create a diverse portfolio of overseas market shares and the desire to exert political influence in the 
Middle East. Yet, not all credit can be given to Beijing for establishing links with Tehran as Iranian 
officials have taken “determined, consistent and effective initiatives” to entice China to build a 
relationship with Iran.60 By advertising itself as a reliable energy source and key strategic partner in the 
Middle East, Iran has managed to gain the PRC’s attention and advance Sino-Iranian relations. 
Additionally, aside from acknowledging Tehran’s crucial role in the energy market, Beijing also recognises 
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Iran’s vital geostrategic location and its potential to be an energy transport base between the Middle East, 
Central Asia, and Europe.61  
Since the 1980s, Sino-Iranian relations have evolved from a focus on arm sales to one that encompasses 
commercial, energy, and diplomatic dealings. This shift in relations is partly attributed to the international 
sanctions imposed on Iran, as increasing isolation has forced Tehran to search for alternate markets to 
export its energy resources. Moreover, Iranian leaders are aware that the geopolitics of oil has shifted 
from West to East, as incremental growth is creating a demand for oil from the three non-Western 
territories of China, India and the Middle-Eastern region. As a result, there has been a steady increase in 
the energy interdependence between Asian and Gulf States. 62  Essentially, Sino-Iranian relations are 
considered to be mutually complementary or naturally symbiotic as the Chinese have a ballooning 
economy that requires hydrocarbon resources which, in turn, provides a market for Iran’s surplus of 
energy commodities.63 
3.1 BACKGROUND: SINO-IRANIAN TIES 
The development of Sino-Iranian relations stems from a gradual expansion of ties between China and the 
Middle East. The birth of this relationship has been traced back to the second century BCE when the 
Han Dynasty of China opened up the Silk Road and established trade with the Parthian Empire. 64 
Although official diplomatic relations were established in 1971, Iran kept China at a distance as the US 
pressured Tehran to limit its interaction with communist Beijing. However, before his overthrow in 1979, 
the Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi) sought to improve relations with China as mutual concern over 
Soviet actions in Asia edged the PRC and Iran to achieve greater co-operation. Yet, relations with China 
were again strained when revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni (the post-revolutionary 
successor to the Shah), in rebellion against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and US, 
supported a foreign policy that was “neither West nor East.” However, Khomeni’s suspicions of China 
had to be revised as Iran’s isolation and war with Iraq forced Tehran to cooperate a little more with 
Beijing. The Islamic Republic had come to perceive that China could be used as a counterbalancing 
mechanism against the USSR and US, thus providing Iran with much needed leverage on the international 
stage.65 Tehran’s new outlook towards China suited Beijing’s global political agenda as it provided the 
Chinese with a gateway to pursue their territorial ambitions in Iran and, more importantly, the greater 
Middle East.66 
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The endurance of the Sino-Iranian relationship is attributed to shared interests and similar political 
outlooks.67 Past grievances against Western domination have also played a part in shaping both nations’ 
contemporary outlooks on global politics. With memories of ‘victimisation’ and ‘vulnerability’ at the 
hands of Western imperialists etched deep into their cultural psyche, Beijing and Tehran continue to 
protest against Western imperialism and hegemonic behaviour.68 As a result, both countries distrust the 
US and frequently criticise Washington’s policy of liberal interventionism as ‘imperialist’ and 
‘hegemonic’.69 By acknowledging their historical lineage of having once been ‘great civilisations’, Beijing 
and Tehran draw inspiration from this narrative to reassert their great power status.70 This essentially fuels 
China’s “foreign policy goals of a multi-polar world, free of US hegemony, where regional powers play 
the dominant role within their respective spheres of influence.”71 In this regard, Beijing and Tehran’s 
ambitions have remained quite similar. 
Even though the commonalities between China and Iran portray a grounded relationship, ‘when push 
comes to shove’, Beijing has, on various occasions, demonstrated that it is willing to side-line Iran in 
favour of remaining in comity with the US. This was particularly demonstrated when China 
acknowledged calls from Washington to abandon nuclear co-operation with Iran in 1997. Although Iran 
felt betrayed by China’s actions, the Iranian leadership realised that it was still in Tehran’s best interests to 
continue working with the Chinese on economic and political issues. Thus, it is by means of such 
flexibility that the Chinese and Iranians have created a durable, albeit limited, relationship that continues 
to persist under straining conditions.72 
Contrary to framing Sino-Iranian relations in terms of mutual co-operation, Harold and Nader emphasise 
that this relationship is characterised by a lopsided or asymmetrical dependence. 73  China has subtly 
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conveyed that, instead of viewing Tehran as a vital strategic energy ally, Iran is considered to be one of 
several countries that it interacts with on a mercantilist basis. 74  Although the PRC views Iran as a 
potential partner for limiting US advancements in the Middle East, Beijing is not overly reliant on Tehran 
for its energy needs, economic development or national security. This is demonstrated by China’s globally 
dispersed sources of oil and its substantial oil imports from other Middle-Eastern nations, most notably 
Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, because of Iran’s small number of allies and shunning of the US, 
Tehran has come to rely heavily on Beijing for vital diplomacy, economic, military and technological 
assistance. Although China’s dependency on Iran is minimal, Sino-Iranian relations have nonetheless 
enhanced Beijing’s capacity to become a vital player in Middle-Eastern issues. Aware of how sanctions 
have heightened the Islamic Republic’s vulnerability, Beijing is exploiting Iran by utilising its increasing 
isolation from the international community to demand Iranian oil at discounted prices. Despite such 
exploitive demands, Tehran is not willing to dismiss the PRC, as China provides the Islamic Republic 
with vital diplomatic cover in the international arena. Although Beijing acknowledges that its relationship 
with Tehran (a pariah state) may tarnish its image as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and threaten Sino-US 
relations, China has nonetheless demonstrated an unusual support for Iran. 75 
3.2 ECONOMIC 
3.2.1 Trade 
In 1979 both nations undertook drastic reforms that laid the building blocks for their intricate present day 
economic and political relationship.76 For Iran, the Islamic Revolution and subsequent hostage debacle 
led to the deterioration of Tehran’s relationship with the West as it was faced with economic sanctions 
and diplomatic isolation. Whilst Beijing, under Deng Xiaoping, implemented market-based reforms that 
were followed by a rise in GDP growth which subsequently led to the ascendance of China as an 
international force. 
Sino-Iranian economic relations have grown at an annual average of 40 per cent over the past few years.77 
This is demonstrated by the level of trade between the two nations increasing from US$ 400 million in 
1994 to US$ 29 billion in 2008.78 Although economic exchanges were first limited to military purchases by 
Iran, trade exchanges between Beijing and Tehran have primarily advanced through general trade and oil-
gas dealings. Both nations have hosted various conferences that promote bi-lateral trade and economic 
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co-operation. However, energy is, without question, the main pillar of Sino-Iranian economic ties. Due to 
China’s energy demands, bi-lateral trade in fuel resources rose. In addition to rising energy trade, bi-lateral 
trade in other goods also increased – with total bi-lateral interaction rising from US$ 700 million in 1993 
to US$ 5.6 billion in 2003.79 Aware of Iran’s vast energy resource endowments, Beijing and Tehran have 
signed various energy deals worth millions of dollars. However, unlike China who mainly views Iran as an 
energy source and another market for Chinese goods, the Iranians highly value Chinese patronage. The 
PRC has come to be indispensable to the Iranian economy as it is considered to be an important energy 
customer, a source of technological knowledge, and a major investor in a variety of Iranian sectors. 80 
Though energy trade dominates Sino-Iranian relations, it has become evident that both nations are 
interested in expanding economic dealings to incorporate various other sectors. In efforts to expand the 
Sino-Iranian relationship beyond energy, the two nations established the Chinese-Iranian Joint 
Commission on Economic, Trade, Scientific, and Technical Co-operation in 1993.81 This keen interest in 
diversifying relations became particularly evident in 2005 when Beijing expressed interest in strengthening 
labour ties between the two nations and the possibility of initiating co-operation with regards to 
aerospace ventures.82 However, it was a signed aluminium deal worth US$ 1 billion that significantly 
demonstrated China’s interests in diversifying its relations with Iran.83 Additionally, China’s desire to 
dabble in different Iranian sectors was again demonstrated at the 2009 Iran-China Economic Co-
operation Conference, where many Chinese companies finalised negotiations and signed agreements to 
improve Iranian infrastructure and the country’s mining and construction industries.84 More recently, in 
the wake of sanctions issued against the Islamic Republic, China displayed its keenness to expand its 
interests in the country when Beijing signed a US$ 20 billion agreement in May 2011 to boost bi-lateral 
co-operation in Iran’s industrial and mining sectors.85 
The Iranian market is considered to be extremely profitable for China as “the abundant natural resources, 
big market, geographic location and educated workforce,” are advantageous factors that have enticed 
Beijing to engage with Tehran.86 This is echoed by the estimated 250 Chinese companies involved in a 
variety of projects or retailing in low-cost consumer products in Iran.87 Moreover, due to the positives of 
trading with Iran, the two countries have announced that they plan to more than double their annual bi-
lateral trade from US$ 30 billion - US$ 40 billion to US$ 100 billion by 2016.88 China’s growing economic 
influence and the effects of sanctions have altered Iran’s trading patterns – Tehran has become 
increasingly dependent on China both as a market and as a source of consumer and industrial goods.89 
This plays to Beijing’s advantage in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). Additionally, there has been 
an increase in China’s exports to Iran which, since 2001, have increased nearly sixteen fold to US$ 12.2 
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billion.90 Such improvements in Chinese-Iranian commercial dealings led China to surpass the European 
Union (EU) in 2009 to become Iran’s largest trading partner, with a bi-lateral trade volume estimated at 
more than US$ 21 billion.91 
Although the Sino-Iranian economic relationship has evolved to become highly robust, China and Iran 
have “yet to fully exploit their economic potential in various [other] spheres” as the regulatory framework 
underpinning this relationship requires substantial improvements.92 It has been suggested that the Sino-
Iranian economic relationship could be enhanced with the signing of a customs agreement and the co-
ordination of import and export regulations between the two nations.93 In addition, due to financial and 
banking obstacles hindering deals from moving forward, China and Iran need to establish a legal 
arbitration board for bi-lateral disagreements. 94  Due to erratic pricing and contractual terms that 
frequently come with “political strings attached,” observers have speculated that Iran’s strenuous business 
climate could possibly influence China to rely more on Saudi Arabia to meet its energy demands.95 
Nevertheless, for now Iran continues to be a key piece in China’s foreign economic-energy puzzle. 
3.2.2 Energy 
As OPEC’s (Oil Producing Export Countries) second largest oil exporter, Iran produces 3.7 million 
barrels of crude oil per day and is ranked as the world’s fourth-largest oil producer.96 Furthermore, the 
country has oil reserves collectively estimated at 155 billion barrels and gas reserves at 33 trillion cubic 
metres.97 Thus, it is not surprising that energy driven China has developed a keen interest in Tehran’s 
energy sector. 
Although energy in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has provided a second energy link with Iran, 
Iranian crude is still the main attraction. Ever since China’s first purchase of Iranian oil in 1974 under the 
Shah’s regime, the PRC’s oil imports from Iran have grown substantially.98 Within a space of two years, 
oil imports from Iran increased from seven million tons in 2000 to eleven million tons in 2002.99 As a 
result of this marked increase in Iranian oil imports, Iran was positioned in 2003 as the second largest oil 
exporter to China, after Saudi Arabia.100 In addition, the oil connection between the two nations was 
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further reiterated in 2009 when the PRC surpassed Japan to become Iran’s top oil customer.101 Iranian 
crude oil accounts for approximately 10-15  per cent of China’s total oil imports.102  
Although this  per centage is miniscule when compared to Saudi Arabia and Angola, the Chinese have 
calculated reasons for importing Iranian oil. Crude oil from Iran not only assists in meeting rapidly 
increasing Chinese consumption demands, it also helps contain rising import expenses as the sour crude 
oil (sulphur-rich) found in Iran is comparatively cheaper than sweet crude (carbon-rich).103 Moreover, 
access to Iranian oil is gaining importance as Iran provides China with an opportunity to access its oil 
reserves without competition from Western oil companies.104 Iran is also one of the few Middle-Eastern 
states that permit China to carry out business in upstream sectors (crude oil exploration and 
extraction/production).105 This demonstrates how, by being amongst a few Middle East countries that 
allow Chinese NOCs to carry out upstream ventures, Tehran is using its energy reserves to strengthen its 
partnership with Beijing and fortify its position as an important regional player.106 Aside from upstream 
developments, Chinese NOCs have also shown a strong interest in downstream developments. This has 
resulted in more than one hundred Chinese companies operating in Iran to develop the metro, ports, 
airports, and oil and natural gas facilities.107 Essentially, in efforts to improve the future of China’s energy 
security, upstream and downstream projects are a part of Beijing’s plan to internationalise its NOCs and 
gain equity stakes in production.108 
Despite Iran barring foreign oil companies from concession agreements and restricting them to ‘buy 
back’ contracts, Chinese NOCs, unlike many other international oil companies, are not deterred by 
Tehran’s approach to dealing with overseas energy firms.109 China’s growing focus on the Iranian energy 
sector is demonstrated by the 166 Chinese companies that attended the Iranian Oil Show in 2011, as 
opposed to the one hundred firms that attended in 2010.110 Moreover, aside from signing numerous 
energy agreements, Iran has also formed a joint oil and gas committee with China to advance energy co-
operation. Apart from purchasing Iranian crude oil and gas, Beijing (after Japan’s withdrawal from deals 
due to US pressure) has, by securing the massive Azadegan and Yadvaran oil and gas fields, become a 
formidable player in Iranian upstream operations.111 
Although China has acquired numerous Iranian fuel agreements, Iran’s energy sector has presented 
Beijing with various challenges. Tehran traditionally restricts foreign ownership of its hydrocarbon 
resources and, due to this, China has been provided with limited opportunities to acquire equity in Iranian 
oil.112 Like its Western and Japanese counterparts, Chinese investors are prone to becoming frustrated 
with Iran’s approach to drafting contracts and business dealings, as possible ventures usually involve 
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continuous rounds of back and forth negotiations and unimplemented business deals.113 Nevertheless, 
such irritations have not hindered China from filling the void that sanctions have created in Tehran’s 
energy sector. Due to being wary of fines under the Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), various companies have 
withdrawn from the Islamic Republic as numerous businesses believe that the “political and public 
relation problems more than outweigh business rewards.” 114  By viewing the pull out of Western 
companies as an opportunity to gain a stronger foothold in the Iranian energy sector, the Chinese have 
seized this opening by signing various energy deals, particularly during 2005 to 2010.115 Energy related 
agreements signed during this period are estimated to be worth US$ 120 billion.116 Investments of note 
include a US$ 40 billion deal to update the Iranian petroleum refining industry, a US$ 2 billion Sinopec 
Group agreement to develop the Yadavaran oil field and an additional US$ 70 billion in assistance 
directed towards the development of the Yadavaran oil field in exchange for 10 million tons of LNG 
from Iran.117 
Despite fortifying Sino-Iranian relations with economic-energy agreements, in light of Iran’s outdated 
energy infrastructure analysts are still left with technical difficulties in terms of deciphering how 
successfully energy agreements are being implemented towards meeting China’s energy needs.118 As a 
result of the numerous energy contracts that have been initiated between the two nations, the Islamic 
Republic has subsequently been provided with cover to weather sanctions that target its energy sector.119 
However, the ‘life jacket’ that Beijing provides Tehran’s energy sector can easily be revoked. Due to “the 
challenges and potential political backlash” linked with conducting business in Iran, most Sino-Iranian 
agreements are in the “form of non-binding memoranda of understanding which are easily revocable in 
the event of political, economic, or internal instability”.120 
Taking into consideration the damage that UN sanctions and unilateral measures have inflicted on Iran’s 
economy, Tehran views Beijing as a lifeline now more than ever. China is considered to be a strong 
economic partner that is capable of providing the crucial investment and technology that is need for 
Iran’s economic development. On the energy front, Beijing’s vested interests in Tehran’s energy sector 
are vital as Iran lacks the necessary expertise and capital to modernise its declining energy industry, 
especially its oil refining capabilities.121 Until recently, Tehran did not possess the refining capabilities to 
meet domestic oil needs, thus Iran had to import approximately 40  per cent of its refined oil to meet 
demands.122 However, with sanctions limiting refined oil exports to the country, Iran was forced to 
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expand its oil refining capacity. Despite needing more than US$ 100 billion in investments to maintain 
and modernise its oil production capacity, Iranian officials are wary of granting foreign firms overly 
generous access to their energy resources.123 Thus, Downs states that the “Iranians themselves have been 
more effective in deterring investment in their oil sector than US sanctions.”124 However, by appealing to 
its dominant energy beneficiary, China increased fuel shipments to the Islamic Republic and is aiding Iran 
with its refining expansion efforts.125 Assisting Iran has provided the Chinese with an opportunity to 
expand their foreign investment and a chance to enter Tehran’s ‘good books’ for securing future oil 
supplies.126 Since the Chinese are essentially keeping the Iranian energy sector afloat, Molavi suggests that 
the Sino-Iranian relationship seems to be more vital for Tehran than Beijing. 127  By playing on this 
asymmetrical dependence, Chinese firms have asserted that if there are hindrances that prevent China’s 
Iranian projects from obtaining attractive profits, they will revert to a peripheral position in the country’s 
energy sector.128 
Despite the seemingly anchored Sino-Iranian economic-energy relationship, major Chinese national 
energy companies (NECs) have been stalling the implementation of agreements in Iran in the face of 
sanctions against Tehran. However, there has been no clear indication if the decision to delay the 
implementation of energy deals is a directive from the Chinese government or based on Chinese NECs’ 
wariness of proceeding with energy plans in a high-risk environment. Harold and Nader suggest that 
firms are individually weighing up the risks to avoid a Libyan scenario, where analysts forecasted that a 
democratic Libya would potentially cost China US$ 18.8 billion in investments.129 While awaiting the 
outcome of the Obama Administration’s deliberation regarding the possibility of sanctioning Chinese 
firms under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestments Act of 2010 (CISADA), 
China delayed the implementation of an estimated US$ 40 billion in 2010 investments to revamp Iran’s 
petroleum industry.130 Thus, of the US$ 40 billion, China, in 2011, had so far only provided less than US$ 
3 billion. 131  If a high risk business environment is behind Chinese NECs reluctance to implement 
decisions it can be assumed that, once Tehran gains a more favourable international status, China is likely 
to advance the implementation of agreements in order to avoid competition from other countries who 
may want to re-engage with Iran.132 
3.3 GEOSTRATEGIC: COUNTERING US HEGEMONY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
In terms of geostrategic reasoning the Islamic Republic is of major importance to China. Iran stands out 
mainly because it is the largest and most populous Islamic country in the oil abundant Middle East.133 
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Moreover, due to its strategic location, geographical land mass and human resources, Iran is considered to 
be a regional power in the Middle East. The Islamic Republic is deemed to be geo-strategically imperative 
because:134 firstly, Iran has a stretching coastline on the North Arabian Sea which dominates the entire 
eastern side of the Persian Gulf. Secondly, the Islamic Republic has lengthy borders with Iraq, Turkey, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Furthermore, Iran also borders on some of the remaining republics of the 
former Soviet Union, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Lastly, towards the North of Iran, 
the country also has a coastline on the Caspian Sea and shares borders with states in the Central Asian 
region. 
Taking these geostrategic factors into account and the country’s potential as a regional power, in the 
1970s Washington considered Iran to be a ‘strategic pillar’ in America’s grand strategy for Western 
Asia.135 However, with the ousting of the Shah in 1979 and the Iranian hostage crisis, the US revised its 
views of Iran and deduced that the country was to be considered a ‘strategic threat’.136 Over the years, 
Washington’s aversion towards Tehran has been demonstrated by the numerous unilateral sanctions 
against the country and speeches by American officials that deem the country to be a ‘pariah’ state and 
part of the ‘axis of evil’. As such, the Americans have strategically established an expansive military and 
naval presence in the Middle East in order to protect their oil investments, to insure regional stability and, 
most importantly, to serve as a warning to Iran. 137  However, the military execution of the US’s 
“unilateralist” foreign policy (under the Bush administration) has produced significant changes in 
geostrategic alliances.138 This is particularly demonstrated by the strengthened Sino-Iranian relationship. 
China perceives that America’s policy towards the Middle East and its established military presence serves 
to bolster the US’s dominance in the region.139 Stemming from Beijing’s desire for a multi-polar world 
and its opposition to the US’s hegemonic influence in the Arab world, a part of China’s foreign policy 
towards the Middle East is, from a realist-mercantilist perspective, based on opposing American 
hegemony in the area.140 Beijing strongly favours multi-polarity because the PRC “believes that a regional 
and international environment in which the US is obliged to accept the diversity of political and social 
systems best serves China’s interests.”141 Such thinking could possibly stem from Beijing’s anxiety over 
Washington’s ability to control strategic global areas and its potential to cut off energy supplies to China 
in the event of a military conflict, possibly over Taiwan.142 Additionally, Chinese analysts are concerned 
with Washington’s potential to utilise its hegemonic status to assert control over oil resources that could 
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be used as leverage to coerce major oil consumers, since, “once you control the gulf, you control Europe, 
Japan and China, like holding the tap in your hands.”143 Thus, oil is more than just a fuel resource, it is a 
power tool. 
However, without any strong historical ties or a longstanding strategic interest in the region, China’s 
mission to ‘chip away’ at American dominance in the Middle East is hampered. Thus Beijing has avoided 
directly challenging the US’s hegemonic position. Instead, the PRC is indirectly working towards 
minimising America’s strong influence in the area by supporting or building relationships with regimes 
that have an aversion towards the US’s presence in the Middle East.144 In this regard, Iran is considered to 
be an ideal partner for China. Aware of the Islamic Republic’s emergence as a regional power, 
geostrategic location, distaste of America’s influence in the region and, most importantly, Iran’s shared 
view of a multi-polar world, Beijing has sought to forge sturdy economic, diplomatic and military ties with 
Tehran to counterbalance US power in the Middle East. 
Since American-Gulf alliances have established a security regime that is in line with the US’s interests in 
the Middle East,145 China has been prompted to pursue substantial military and defence relations with 
Iran. The Chinese strategically reason that assisting Iran with military improvements indirectly 
counterbalances US dominance in the Persian Gulf.146 Furthermore, there have been suggestions that 
Beijing may eventually propose to enter into a formal defence relationship with Iran147 but, due to the 
negative implications that such an agreement would have on China’s relations with the US, the Arab 
world and Israel, a Sino-Iranian defence relationship seems improbable. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that geopolitical co-operation between China and Iran is stunted. On the contrary, geostrategic 
collaboration between these two nations can continue to advance, despite the absence of a formal defence 
agreement.148 Chinese analysts advocate that Beijing’s efforts to strengthen ties with Iran could serve as a 
hedge to prevent Iran from succumbing to American influences in the future, especially if the Islamic 
Republic’s current regime is overthrown and replaced with a more pro-American government. 149 
However, China and Iran’s diverging interests regarding the US limits the extent of their opposition 
towards Washington. Unlike Tehran who is almost entirely cut off from the US’s economy and has to 
deal with numerous American-led international sanctions, Beijing depends greatly on Washington for its 
economic growth and the protection of its oil shipments along East Asian sea routes. Thus, China’s desire 
to counter America’s dominance in the Middle East is limited by its dependence on favourable trade and 
investment relations with Washington.150 
In sum, in spite of the imposition of international sanctions against Iran, Sino-Iranian relations have 
grown considerably. This is particularly demonstrated by the increase in trade between the two countries, 
as well as their shared interest in expanding relations to encompass non-energy related co-operation and 
investment. Nevertheless, energy (particularly the export of large amounts of oil to China) remains the 
cornerstone of this relationship – it is a significant factor that rationalises Beijing’s maintenance of ties 
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with the internationally condemned Tehran. However, as a result of a risky Iranian business climate, 
Chinese NECs have been stalling the implementation of energy agreements with Iranian suppliers. This 
has led to increased doubts over China’s commitment to Iran in the face of Western calls for Beijing to 
distance itself from a nuclear-aspirant Tehran. Aside from Iran’s alluring hydrocarbon assets, the Chinese 
also acknowledge the significant role that Tehran can play in keeping a check on US influence in the 
Middle East. Aware of the country’s geostrategic position and its regional power status, Beijing has been 
motivated to forge sturdy ties with Tehran in order to counterbalance US power in the Middle East. 
However, unlike Iran, Beijing’s economic dependence on Washington limits it from significantly 
minimising the US’s dominance in the Middle East. Although Sino-Iranian relations have grown and 
strengthened over the years, diplomatic pressure placed on China to contribute to isolating Tehran may 
have influenced the Chinese to reassess their economic-energy interests in Iran. Nevertheless, even 
though the Islamic Republic is regarded as just another market and energy source for China, Beijing 
cannot be easily swayed in its decision to engage with Iran as it has come to play a vital role in shaping 
Chinese interest in the Middle East. 
4. CHINA’S PERSIAN GULF DILEMMA: BEIJING’S 
BALANCING ACT BETWEEN IRAN AND THE US 
Since Beijing’s earnest engagement with Persian Gulf countries in the early 1970s, China has been aware 
of the US’s strong presence within the Gulf. This has challenged Chinese foreign policy to strike a fine 
balance between maintaining sound relations with the US against its interests in developing multi-faceted 
relationships with energy important Gulf countries. This includes countries that are at odds with 
Washington’s policies. China’s ‘Persian Gulf Dilemma’, (often referred to as Beijing’s ‘balancing act’, 
tightrope walk’, and ‘dual game’) essentially refers to China’s efforts to balance its interests in pursuing 
Iran’s energy resources against its interests in maintaining sound relations with the US.151 This has proven 
to be a challenging task for Beijing, as Washington has repeatedly called upon China to assist US efforts 
in isolating Iran for its relentless pursuit of achieving nuclear proliferation capabilities.152 However, in 
light of China’s burgeoning energy demands, Beijing has developed a strategic energy relationship with 
Iran that is considered to be of crucial importance to the PRC. Aware of these two aspects of the Persian 
Gulf Dilemma, Chinese leaders have treaded carefully in this part of the world (especially with Iran) to 
avoid being perceived by Washington as a direct threat to its hegemonic position in the region. Thus, it 
has been suggested that China’s foreign policy will continue to try and balance the two aspects of its 
Persian Gulf Dilemma, as the costs of siding with either side are too great.153 
Although China will continue to avoid directly challenging the US’s hegemony in the Gulf, recent 
developments in the energy aspect of the Sino-Iranian relationship, according to Garver et al., highlight 
that Beijing has calculated that it can ‘get away with more’, in terms of energy investments without 
provoking serious US scrutiny.154 Such calculations likely stem from Beijing’s desire to maximise the 
scope of its energy investments in Iran. Having invested tremendously in Iran’s energy sector, Beijing is 
unlikely to support former Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton’s ambition of implementing “crippling 
sanctions” against Iran.155 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the Chinese perceive the US’s policy of 
containing Iran as a unilateral initiative that has been calculated by Washington to ensure its dominance in 
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the region and ability to dictate to others.156 Nevertheless, aware of the importance that Washington 
places on non-proliferation, China sees very little reason to trigger American aggression by limiting the 
US’s efforts to curb the advancement of Iran’s nuclear capabilities.157 This became clearly evident in 1997 
when American and Chinese negotiations over China’s nuclear co-operation with Iran resulted in Beijing 
suspending all nuclear, cruise missile and nuclear capable ballistic missile co-operation with Tehran.158 
Yet, after Russia, Beijing remains Iran’s second largest arms supplier. Although sensitive military 
technology to Iran has been halted, China still supplies the Islamic Republic with weapons and various 
types of military equipment. 
Even though numerous elites in decision-making ranks have voiced that China should play a more active 
role in the Middle East in order to protect its oil supply, citizens and firms in various Middle-Eastern 
countries, Beijing remains determined to keep a low profile in this region so as to avoid overshadowing or 
threatening American dominance in the area. 159  This reflects Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy of 
“observing calmly, securing our position, coping with affairs calmly” and, “never claiming leadership, 
maintaining a low profile, making some contributions.”160 In an attempt to stamp its neutrality between 
the US and Iran, Beijing emphasises that China seeks to, “make friends with all countries,” irrespective of 
a country’s relationship with the US.161 The Chinese insist that it is not reasonable for Washington to 
insist that China choose between the US and its rivals. It seems that Beijing is using the notion of 
“making friends with all countries” based on China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to ‘butter its 
bread on both sides’. 162 Moreover, taking into consideration the rise in geostrategic stakes for both China 
and the US, Garver et al., contend that Washington is not buying into Beijing’s rhetoric, especially when 
‘friendly co-operation’ entails Chinese ties with US deemed ‘pariah’ or ‘rogue’ states such as Iran.163 
Ultimately, China’s relationship with Washington is bound to be jeopardised if Beijing does not alter the 
rules of its dual game in the Gulf as at some point the US is bound to understand Beijing’s subterfuge.164 
Consequentially, this could lead the Americans to view the Chinese with increased scepticism; thus 
possibly leading to the demise of whatever trust and confidence Washington has placed in Beijing.165 
Owing to Beijing’s awareness of the US’s central role in its economic growth, the Chinese realise that the 
deterioration of Sino-American relations would endanger China’s economic advancements and its 
                                                     
156
 Calabrese, “China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security,” p. 361. 
157
 Garver, Leverett and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing its 
“Persian Gulf Dilemma,” p. 8. 
158
 Ibid., p. 8. 
Beijing’s commitment to suspending nuclear cooperation with Iran was startling as, not only did China suspend 
all nuclear cooperation with Tehran, it also suspended nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic under the 
NPT (the NPT permits nuclear cooperation between states under the IAEA). Although China sided with the US 
it does not mean that the nature of its dual game has changed without obtaining some quid pro quo from the 
United States. According to Graver et al., Beijing has consistently bargained hard. This has resulted in China 
frequently obtaining US concessions in return for Beijing’s restraint or policy modifications with regards to the 
Middle East. – Garver, Leverett and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for 
Managing its “Persian Gulf Dilemma,” p. 8. 
159
 Garver, Leverett and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing its 
“Persian Gulf Dilemma,” p. 10. 
160
 Bingbing, “Strategy and Politics in the Gulf as seen from China,” p. 15. 
161
 Garver, Leverett and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing its 
“Persian Gulf Dilemma,” pp. 32-33. 
162
 Ibid., p. 33. 
163
 Garver, Leverett and Leverett, “Moving (Slightly) Closer to Iran: China’s Shifting Calculus for Managing its 
“Persian Gulf Dilemma,” pp. 33. 
164
 Ibid. 
165
 Garver, “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” p. 87. 
25 
 
diplomatic ‘rise’.166 As such, the PRC acknowledges that complete non-co-operation with Washington 
over Iran is not an option in the short term. Thus, China will continue to interact cautiously with Tehran 
and other Middle East states in an effort to avoid heightened confrontation with the US or a full 
partnership with Iran. However, Garver et al., deduce that the precise balance that Beijing strikes between 
the two parties is shifting towards a direction that focuses on China’s ability to garner a stronger foothold 
in Iran’s energy sector whilst simultaneously averting American suspicions. Nevertheless, Beijing’s sense 
of leeway does not mean that China will abandon caution in its dealings with Iran. 
4.1 CHINA’S STANCE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 
Since the US’s first unilateral sanction against Iran in 1979, there has been an international campaign, 
mainly led by the Americans, against Tehran’s uranium enrichment project and the subsequent possibility 
of nuclear weapons’ development. Washington has expressed that sanctions need to be ‘crippling’, 
however, the US is not the only country to express aggressive views towards Iran.167 Similar sentiments 
have been voiced by other states, for example the former president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, stated 
that sanctions need to be “massive,” and according to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, 
actions against Iran have to be “biting”.168 With these views in mind, the US and its accomplices issued 
another round of sanctions against the Islamic Republic in 2010 with the aim of weakening the country so 
severely that Tehran would have no option but to halt its nuclear advancements. However, for sanctions 
to be truly effective the participation of China (Iran’s largest trading partner and massive oil importer) is 
considered to be vital. Yet, the West is struggling to gain Chinese support over issues that concern 
proliferation, sanctions, arm sales, trade and energy investments.169 Aware of the continued diplomatic 
pressure placed on China to support the West’s isolation efforts, Iran seeks to project itself as a secure 
energy supply for Beijing. By doing so, Tehran aims to deepen diplomatic relations with the PRC in an 
attempt to hold on to the leverage and protection that China can offer it. This makes it difficult for China 
to side with the West as Iran is the “only country where the risk of energy and foreign policy interests 
colliding is high”.170 
Given the extenuating circumstances, China has thus far maintained a stable relationship with both the 
US and Iran. In line with its balancing strategy, Beijing has supported sanctions against Iran 
diplomatically, and simultaneously flouted them behind closed doors to maintain its lucrative and strategic 
economic and political ties with Tehran.171 Essentially, China’s posture towards Iranian sanctions is best 
viewed as “a microcosm of the PRC’s larger balancing act in pursuing economic and political leverage 
without upsetting Western, particularly American, sensitivities.” 172  Thus, although China seeks to 
maintain its relationship with Iran – a strategic partner in the Middle East – it is essential for China to 
support the international campaign against the Islamic Republic in order to sustain the global non-
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proliferation regime and prevent the escalation of volatilities in this highly sensitive region.173 Yet, in this 
high stakes game of ‘geopolitical poker’ being played between the West and Iran over the latter’s nuclear 
plans, Berman believes that China has clearly placed its bet on Iran.174 Having assessed the possible 
outcomes, he states that if the Chinese are right and Iran does achieve nuclear capabilities it will have 
massive impacts on regional politics and global energy.175 However, if Beijing loses its wager, the Chinese 
economy could be severely affected. 
A three-pronged approach has been adopted by the international community to deal with Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions.176 The most far reaching action has been the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran, with the 
latest being Resolution 1929 which was passed in 2010. Secondly, unilateral sanctions aimed at curbing 
international energy investment in Tehran’s energy sector have been issued predominantly by the US. 
However, in an effort to garner support, the US has encouraged other countries to implement nation-
specific regulations or sanctions to assist in isolating Iran. The EU has followed suit by prohibiting EU 
members’ involvement in Iran’s energy and financial sectors.177 Furthermore, the EU’s implementation of 
an oil embargo in 2012 against Tehran has severely affected Iranian oil exports, with a potential loss of 20  
per cent in oil export sales.178 Thirdly, due to the risky and strenuous business climate that sanctions have 
created, there has been a voluntary pull out of the private sector from Iran. Consequently, this has 
severely impacted the Iranian economy.179 Since the international community aims to slow down Iran’s 
nuclear advancements and ultimately force the regime to abandon its nuclear aspirations, the main 
purpose of the three-pronged approach is to make it more expensive and complex for Tehran to obtain 
industrial equipment and nuclear supplies.180 Nevertheless, even though sanctions are straining the Iranian 
economy and limiting the country’s prospects for economic growth, Iran remains persistent in advancing 
its nuclear agenda.181 
Unlike Washington and its allies who have made concerted efforts to isolate Iran, the PRC is reluctant to 
join the US-led mission against Tehran. In spite of participating in UN sanctions against Tehran’s nuclear 
ambitions, China has also upheld a strong economic relationship with Iran that actively lessens the impact 
of sanctions against the Islamic Republic.182 Aware that China is Iran’s top trading partner and one of the 
largest remaining importers of Iranian oil, the West believes that Beijing’s participation in an oil embargo 
is considered to be imperative if the mission to impede Iran’s nuclear ambitions is to be successful. 
However, due to the PRC’s economic, energy and geostrategic interests in Iran, China is wary of 
supporting an oil embargo or meaningful sanctions against Tehran. As a result, Chinese policies 
(especially Beijing’s desire for economic growth and the emphasis that it places on sovereignty and non-
interference), have hampered US and international efforts that aim to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
Noting this, Iran has, to a considerable extent, come to regard China as its main diplomatic protector 
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against external pressures.183 Nevertheless, China does not want to be viewed as a willing enabler that 
could allow Iran to become the tenth nuclear power in the world.184 
Essentially, China’s nuclear diplomacy towards Iran rests on three broad principles: 185  (1) Non-
intervention – avoid meddling in the domestic affairs of another country. (2) Non-nuclear proliferation, 
and (3) preventing the disruption of energy supplies from the Middle East. Since these three points 
underpin China’s outlook towards Tehran “Beijing has sought to balance its interests in this nuclear 
standoff” by stressing both Iran’s rights and obligations under the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT).186 
Aware of Iran’s vague nuclear plans, the Chinese have repeatedly voiced their disapproval towards the 
possibility of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, Beijing has underscored the importance for Tehran 
to honour its treaty commitments and cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) in order to address the concerns of the international community. Although Iran has repeatedly 
stated that it has no intentions of creating nuclear weaponry, Tehran has been reluctant to cooperate with 
the IAEA, making numerous states sceptical of its nuclear intentions. 187  Nevertheless, Beijing has 
unwaveringly maintained that diplomacy should not be written off as the Chinese have repeatedly 
emphasised that negotiations within an IAEA framework is still the best way to deal with Iran. 
Furthermore, by recognising Iran as an NPT signatory, Beijing has asserted that Tehran is entitled to 
nuclear energy and technology for civilian purposes.188 
However, if there was telling evidence that Tehran was on the verge of nuclear weapons capability, Yuan 
asserts that China would not hesitate to side with the international community to dismantle Iran’s nuclear 
programme.189 Like the US, the PRC has a strong interest in preventing Tehran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons and undermining the global proliferation regime. Chinese leaders are aware that a nuclear-armed 
Iran has the potential to dramatically destabilise the Middle East and trigger a nuclear arms race that could 
reduce China’s access to critical energy supplies.190 Even though Beijing shares Middle-Eastern security 
concerns with the West, the PRC has not taken substantial measures such as the issuing of unilateral 
sanctions or the utilisation of its political leverage over Tehran to reduce Iran’s potential to become a 
nuclear country. China’s aversion towards sanctions stem from several considerations:191 firstly, and most 
importantly, Beijing places immense importance on the protection of its expanding energy interest in 
Iran. Secondly, China has an aversion towards ‘power politics’ – the implementation of sanctions and 
military force to resolve conflicts. Thirdly, having had sanctions directed against it in the past, Calabrese 
suggests from a constructivist point of view that Beijing sympathises with Iran. Lastly, like Russia, China 
believes that relentlessly pressurising Iran is likely to backlash, resulting in Tehran’s withdrawal from the 
NPT or unilateral military action from the US. 
Chinese leaders also perceive Washington’s endeavours to contain Iran as a unilateral initiative directed by 
American leaders to maintain the county’s dominance in the Gulf and its ability to impose its will on 
others.192 As a result, this line of thinking has not abated Chinese engagement with Iran. Instead, it has led 
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some Chinese elites to believe that a nuclear-armed Iran could prove to be of value in keeping a check on 
the US and its influences in the Persian Gulf.193 Furthermore, Beijing is keen to demonstrate to its rivals 
and allies that it is loyal and prepared to stand by its commitments, even in the light of US pressure.194 
China’s maintenance of relations with Iran could also be viewed as a form of retaliation against the US’s 
diplomatic and military support of Taiwan.195 Yet, from a strategic outlook, in response to the US’s heavy 
military presence in East Asia and its group of allies that encircle China, the Sino-Iranian relationship 
serves as a check against Washington. Most importantly, from a logical point of view, since Iranian oil 
makes up a sizeable portion of Chinese oil imports, China reasons that if it were to adhere to sanctions 
against Iran’s energy sector, the PRC would indirectly be sanctioning itself. 
Due to China’s reluctance to wholeheartedly support sanctions against Iran, Beijing has avoided 
participating heavily in the international sanctions regime against Tehran. Instead, in an attempt to avoid 
jeopardising its interests with both parties, China has been reserved and balanced on the nuclear issue.196 
Yet, China has (mostly likely due to pressure from the US) in line with other Security Council members, 
voted for sanctions against the Islamic Republic. However, Beijing has tactically delayed the passage of 
Security Council Resolutions and watered down sanctions to ensure the protection of its energy 
interests.197 Nevertheless, with China’s stamp of approval on Resolution 1929 (the latest UN sanction 
against Iran), Mahmoud Ahmadinejad questioned Chinese and Russian motives by asking, “Are these 
countries friends and neighbours? Are they with us or looking for something else?” 198  Having 
acknowledged Tehran’s scepticism of China’s motives, Chinese leaders (in spite of China’s hand in the 
implementation of Resolution 1929) re-enforced their nation’s political and economic commitments to 
Iran and emphasised interests in expanding oil and gas ties with Tehran. This is succinctly captured by Li 
Keqiang, China’s former vice premier, who stated that: 
China is willing to work hard with Iran, continue to push mutual political trust [sic], and maintain 
communication, dialogue and coordination on important international issues, to maintain regional and global peace, stability 
and prosperity … The key point is to solidly push forward existing cooperative projects, to ensure they are put into effect 
smoothly, to deepen bi-lateral pragmatic co-operation and promote the continued development of bi-lateral ties.199 
However, despite China’s affirmation of its commitment to Iran, the US may utilise various policy 
options and its status as China’s largest economic market to coerce Beijing to limit its co-operation and 
commitments to Iran.200 Beijing is confident though that its size and economic leverage over the US 
                                                     
193
 Garver, “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” p. 77. 
194
 Zambelis, “China’s Persian Gulf Diplomacy Reflects Delicate Balancing Act,” p. 4. 
195
 Budike, Securing China’s Oil Supply from the Persian Gulf: The Case of Iran and Saudi Arabia, p. 72. 
196
 Douglas, Nelson and Schwartz, “Rising in the Gulf: How China’s Energy Demands are Transforming the 
Middle East,” p. 4. 
Chubin, “Iran and China: Political Partners or Strategic Allies,” p. 68. 
197
 Garver, “Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran?” p. 76. 
198
 Cited by: Molavi, “The New Silk Road, “Chindia,” and The Geo-Economic Ties that Bind the Middle East 
and Asia,” p. 50. 
199
 Fite, U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition: The Impact of China and Russia, pp. 17-18. 
200
 Harold and Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political and Military Relations, p. 23. 
According to Harold and Nader, there are four options that the Washington could utilise to gain Beijing’s 
undivided support for its campaign against Iran: firstly, Washington could offer improved cooperation between 
China and the US over a variety of issues that Beijing considers as important. Or the US could take a more 
aggressive stance and apply diplomatic pressure on China and sanction Chinese firms that invest heavily in Iran. 
Thirdly, Washington could encourage other oil rich nations to increase petroleum exports to the PRC, thus 
altering Beijing’s relative dependence on Iran. Lastly, the US can create a global coalition of partners that could 
pressurise China not to undercut international efforts to sanction Iran. – Harold and Nader, China and Iran: 
Economic, Political and Military Relations, p. 23. 
29 
 
provides the PRC with the necessary weight to ignore calls from Washington to embargo Iranian oil.201 
China is willing to use Washington’s competition with Iran as an opportunity to grow its influence and 
test the boundaries of a US dominated international order. Tactically, China’s “moves are calculated to 
reap the benefits of the US- Iranian conflict”.202 Due to Beijing’s international standing (a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, a key economic partner of both Iran and the West and an important 
player in internal issues), China is positioned to collect benefits in return for its support of either party. 
For example, when Beijing cooperated with Washington to halt its nuclear co-operation with Iran in 
1997, the US in turn committed to high profile presidential visits to China and the United States in 1997 
and 1998.203In return for its support on limited sanctions against Tehran, Beijing could have possibly 
obtained commitments of increased oil exports from Iran’s neighbours, most notably Saudi Arabia.204 
With the pull out of Western firms creating an economic gap, Chinese companies remained in Iran and 
leapt into the void created by sanctions. China’s state-owned firms were able to do so as Beijing only 
abides by UN sanctions which, unlike the US’s unilateral sanctions, contain no clear limits on energy 
investment and trade with Tehran. As a result, Chinese NOCs stepped up on investments in Iran by 
grabbing opportunities to secure gargantuan oil fields that would have, in the absence of sanctions, been 
assigned to Western companies.205 Thus, due to Beijing’s increasing energy activities with the Islamic 
Republic, China became Iran’s largest energy investor in 2010.206 As such, Tehran has come to believe 
that “sanctions are not useful nowdays (sic) because, we have many secondary options in markets like 
China.”207 Essentially, Iran has managed to hold its own in oil markets as its massive oil and gas reserves 
attract the foreign investment of rapidly industrialising countries such as China and India.208 However, 
sanctions against Iran prop up China’s efforts to secure discounts on Iranian crudes, as Beijing utilises the 
fact that it is one of Iran’s largest remaining oil customers to push for cheaper Iranian oil prices.209 
In the face of sanctions, China has invested heavily in Iran’s energy sector, yet Beijing’s support of 
Tehran was questioned when, in light of setting a new oil imports record that exceeded five million b/d in 
April 2010, Chinese imports of Iranian crude had decreased whilst its other major suppliers saw an 
increase in their oil exports to the PRC.210 The volume of Iranian oil imports dropped from 354,000 b/d 
during the first five months of 2009 to 193,000 b/d in the first quarter of 2010.211 Thus, in terms of 
China’s top oil importers Iran was placed at number eight in May 2010.212 The decline of Iranian oil 
imports in light of increasing imports from other sources, led oil industry analysts to ask if China lowered 
its imports from the Islamic Republic for strategic reasons possibly relating to sanctions, or if it was a 
mere pricing issue. Although concrete data is required to answer this question, it does not mean that 
speculation cannot be taken into consideration. There are suggestions that China is supposedly partially 
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complying with the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA), a 
unilateral set of sanctions implemented by the US in 2010 that would most likely have sanctioned Chinese 
NOCs if they did not reduce their activities in Iran. As a result, and in an apparent deal with Washington, 
China’s NECs received instructions from Beijing to slow or halt the implementation of Iranian energy 
deals to make it easier for the Obama administration to exempt Chinese companies from penalties.213 
Another postulation suggests that China’s Iranian oil imports declined due to the US urging Saudi Arabia 
to increase its oil exports to Beijing in an effort to decrease the PRC’s dependence on Iranian oil.214 Yet 
China’s Iranian oil imports rebounded in May 2012, reflecting a resolution to a commercial dispute 
between China United Petroleum & Chemical Co. (Unipec) and National Iranian Oil Co.215 Nonetheless, 
despite a rebound in Iranian oil imports, Chinese officials have not ruled out the possibility that sanctions 
could still disrupt oil purchases from Iran. However, it seems highly unlikely that China would give up its 
Iranian oil imports and developments in Tehran’s upstream because of sanctions.216 This is particularly 
demonstrated by China’s maintenance of Iranian oil imports despite the US sanctioning of Zhuhai 
Zhenrong – a state run enterprise that is heavily involved with Iranian oil imports.217 Such is Chinese 
dedication to importing Iranian oil that, with international sanctions against Tehran making it difficult for 
China to pay Iran, Beijing has in some instances agreed to a barter system to trade Iranian oil for Chinese 
products and services. As a result, such agreements have assisted Tehran to bypass sanctions.218 
Overall, due to the US’s heightened concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities, the Iranian nuclear issue has 
become a prominent topic on the Sino-American diplomatic agenda. It seems that Beijing does not want 
to be cajoled into choosing sides between Iran and the West, as China has gone to great lengths to ensure 
balanced co-operation with both sides. Beijing has displayed that it is a willing and responsible partner in 
maintaining the NPT regime; however, by diluting sanctions, China helps Iran gain time and international 
space to push forward its nuclear agenda. As a result, the effectiveness of the US’s international campaign 
against Iran is severely hindered by China’s balancing act. Due to Beijing’s delicate handling of the Iranian 
nuclear issue, China has assumed a passive role as the PRC continues to press for negotiations and a 
peaceful resolution to the issue.219 On the energy front, Beijing has emphasised that it will not endorse 
any measures that would seriously jeopardise its access to Iranian hydrocarbons or Chinese NOCs pursuit 
of Iranian upstream projects. Yet, when ‘push comes to shove,’ Beijing is likely to “agree to a relatively 
marginal expansion of existing sanctions against Iran, to keep the nuclear issue in the Security Council.”220 
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However, due to Beijing’s vested geo-economic and strategic interests in Iran it can be assumed that 
China will not be prepared to back any measures that would be considered ‘crippling’. 
5. CONCLUSION 
If China continues to maintain stable relations with both the US and the Gulf nations, Beijing is expected 
to become inextricably linked to the energy rich Persian Gulf as its oil consumption continues to rise. In 
efforts to guarantee reliable oil supplies from this part of the world, Beijing has sought to improve 
relations with Gulf States. China is progressively improving its standing with Gulf nations as its large 
consumer market, demand for energy, and avoidance of democratic lobbying provide Gulf countries with 
an attractive alternative to lessen their dependency on the US. Yet, as a result of China’s precautionary 
role in the region and its maintenance of relations with Iran – a potential threat to regional stability - GCC 
states are wary of relinquishing their dependence on the US. Nevertheless, Beijing has made significant 
advances in the Gulf, especially with regards to energy investments. By seeking to improve economic co-
operation with Gulf nations Beijing has sought to secure access to the regions’ hydrocarbon resources, 
especially oil. Although China has expanded its presence in the Gulf, the Chinese have proceeded with 
caution to avoid being perceived as a threat to the Americans who have an expansive presence in the 
region. Yet, there is a growing sense that China is emerging as a rival of the US in the Middle East. Aware 
of this, some Middle-Eastern nations have sought to encourage a Sino-American rivalry in an effort to 
advance their own interests. Due to the US’s suspicions of China’s increasing energy forays in the region, 
China-Gulf relations have been placed under American scrutiny. Of particular concern to the Americans 
are Sino-Iranian relations, since Beijing’s policy of engagement contradicts Washington’s efforts of 
containment.  
Although China has been repeatedly called upon to cooperate with US efforts to isolate the Islamic 
Republic, Beijing is reluctant to assume an aggressive stance against Tehran due to its strategic energy 
relationship with Iran that is reinforced by various economic agreements. Yet, in consolidating relations 
with Iran, Beijing risks causing friction with the US – a country that has a vital hand in ensuring China’s 
continued economic prosperity. Thus, the PRC’s ‘Persian Gulf Dilemma’ essentially pits China’s top 
national priorities of energy security and maintaining sound US relations against each other. In efforts to 
avoid jeopardising its interests with both parties the PRC has assumed a balancing approach that 
fundamentally aligns with the US in denouncing Tehran’s nuclear proliferation ambitions whilst 
simultaneously maintaining its geo-economic interests in Iran. This bifurcated handling of US-Iran 
tensions is particularly evident in China’s response to sanctions against Tehran. Although the PRC 
maintains that continued diplomacy and negotiations are a more effective way of dealing with Iran, 
Beijing has nevertheless, presumably for the sake of maintaining stable ties with Washington, had a hand 
in the issuing of four UN resolutions targeting the Islamic Republic. However, the PRC has played a 
significant role in delaying, deflecting and softening UN sanctions against Iran. Furthermore, in an 
attempt to avoid irking China, UN sanctions were craftily calibrated to avoid jeopardising Chinese Iranian 
energy interests.  
In sum, barring the increased possibility of escalating Iran-US tensions, China’s energy insecurities, 
particularly its oil insecurity, has strongly influenced Beijing to maintain ties with Tehran in spite of 
Western efforts to press the Chinese into fully backing measures to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. By 
continuing to maintain oil imports from the Islamic Republic, China has displayed that it is not willing to 
appease Western calls for a Chinese embargo on Iranian oil or support ‘crippling’ sanctions that would 
undoubtedly infringe on the PRC’s geo-economic interests in this Gulf country. However, even though 
Iran has advertised itself as a reliable energy source for the PRC, China’s fluctuating Iranian oil imports 
have increased speculations over recent years that, should the Tehran-Washington rift expand, it is highly 
likely that China would side with the US if Beijing were forced to choose sides over Iran’s nuclear 
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disposition. Such a decision would inevitably affect China’s stronghold in Iran’s energy sector – 
producing serious repercussions for China’s economy, hence Beijing’s determination (by means of 
maintaining its balancing act) to forestall this potential scenario from occurring. 
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